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EsTATE oF FERRALL

[L. A. No. 22204.

In B11nk.

[41 C.2d

.June 30, 1953.J

Estate of JOHN C. FERRALL, Deceased. ALEXANDER
C. HAMILTON, as Executor, etc., Respondent, v. BANK
OF AMERICA, as Ootrustee, etc., et al., Appellants.
[1] Trusts- Control of Trust Property- Supervisory Power of
Court.-Trustee's exercise of a sole or absolute discretion
vested in him by trust instrument is subject to court review if
trustee acts in bad faith or fraudulently.
[2] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Court.
-Whether good faith has been exercised by trustee, or whether
fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion has been committed,
is subject to consideration by court on appropriate allegations
and proof.
[3] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Court.
-It is against public policy to permit settlor of trust to relieve
trustee of all accountability to the courts.
[4] Id.-Construction.-A trust instrument which provides that no
part of trust estate shall pass to beneficiary's husband,
and which specifically provides that only contingencies on
which beneficiary would be entitled to gift of entire corpus
are those by which her marriage to him is terminated by his
death or by his divorce from her, may not be construed as
showing that settlor intended that during life of beneficiary
and continuance of her marriage the husband should be relieved of responsibility for maintenance of his wife, a responsibility provided for in Civ. Code, § 155.
[5] Husband and Wife-Liability for Wife's Support.-Husband
has duty to support wife even though she has an estate of her
own.
[6] !d.-Liability for Wife's Support.-Where affirmative relief is
sought on ground that there has been a shift in primary
obligation of husband to support wife, it is incumbent on the
one seeking relief to plead and prove facts which would justify
such a shift, as an element of his cause of action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1981.)
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 182; Am.Jur., Trusts, §§ 279, 287.
[5] Duty of husband to provide necessaries for wife as affected
by her possession of independent means, note, 18 A.L.R. 1131. See,
also, Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Husband
and Wife, § 339.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12] Trusts,§ 211; [4] Trusts,§ 164;
[5, 6] Husband and Wife, § 120; [7, 8, 14] Trusts, § 347; [9-11]
Trusts, § 204; [13] Trusts, § 373.
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[7] Trusts-Execution of Trust-Distribution of Property.-'Where
intent of trust instrument is to preserve corpus of trust intact
for distribution to remaindermen except in event the income
is insufficient to meet needs of beneficiary, in construing this
latter provision the settlor's intent to withhold benefit of corpus from beneficiary's husband .must be taken into consideration.
[8] Id.- Execution of '!'rust- Distribution of Property.-Unless
language of trust instrument affirmatively reveals an intention
to make a gift of the stated benefaction regardless of beneficiary's other means, the trustee should consider such other
means in exercising his discretion to disburse the principal.
[9] !d.-Control of Trust Prop~rty-Powers of Trustee.-.A trust
must be. administered in accordance with intentions of settlor.
[lO] Id..-Oontrol of Trust Property-Powers of. Trustee.,.-Extent
of discretion conferred OJ;l tr1;1stees depends primarily on manifestation of intention of settlor.
(11] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Powers of Trustee.-Mere
fact that trustee is. given discretion does not authorize him to
act beyond bounds of a reasonable .judgment.
[12] Id.:_Cont:t'ol of '!'rust Property-Supervisory Power of Court.
-Even though· it is provided that trustees shall have absolute
or unlimited or uncontrolled discretion, the court may. inter~
pose if trustee does not act in a state of mind in which it wa11
contemplated by settlor that he would act.
[13] Id.-Aetions-Presumptions.-Trustees are entitled to pre~
sumption that they acted in good faith.
(14] Id. __.Execution of '!'rust- Distribution of Property,- Although trl1St instrument provides that trustees, in their sole
discretion, may invade corpus of .trust estate to provide for
the "care, needs and comforts" of beneftciary if income :from
corpus is insuffieient for such purpose, refusal to invade corpus
because beneficiary was not in actual need is not an ab'Q.se of
(Jiseretion where trustee§, shortly after Hnotice and dem11,nd11
that corpus of trust be invaded was s!lrved on them, requested
information from beneficiary's husband to establish claim .1rJ.ade
by him as guardia~ of beneficiary, who had beim dechtred incompetent, but .no showing was made by him that any medical
bills remained unpaid o:r that he would be unable to provide
his wife with medical care and treatment in the fnture1 and
where trustees concluded, as result of indepeiJdent investigation, that obliga;tions .of beneficiary were being met and .that
she was receiving adequate medical care and treatment.
[ 8] .Trust provi.sions for payment, in trustee's . discretion or for
a designated purpose,of part or all of the principal to a beneficiary,
note, 2 A.L.R.2d 13'83. See, also, CaJ.Jut., Trusts, § 169 et seq~;
Am.Jur., Trusts, § 481 et seq.
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County directing testamentary trustees to make payment to beneficiary. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed.
Earle M. Daniels, Burdette J. Daniels, Hallam Mathews
and Eugene M. Elson for Appellants.
Potter, Potter & House and Bernard Potter, Jr., for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-Separate appeals have been taken by the
trustees and the contingent remaindermen of a testamentary
trust from an adverse decision in a proceeding brought by the
guardian of the beneficiary, an incompetent person, under
section 1120 of the Probate Code. The proceeding was brought
to compel the trustees to exercise the discretion vested in
them to invade the corpus of the trust estate to provide for
the "care, needs and comforts" of the beneficiary.
John C. Ferrall died testate on October 5, 1940. Surviving
·were his son, George D. Ferrall, his daughter, Mrs. Faye F.
Hamilton, the beneficiary of the trust here involved, and
three grandsons, the children of George. The will was duly
admitted to probate in Los Angeles County and a decree
of distribution entered on February 5, 1943. The decree became final.
The will and the decree of distribution contained the following provisions :
"(d) After payment of any expenses of management of the
trust estate and administering this trust, including the compensation for the services of the trustees, all income from the
trust which is available for distribution shall be distributed
monthly to and for the use and benefit of my daughter, Faye
F. Hamilton, during her lifetime, or unless sooner terminated
in accordance herewith. That if at any time the income
from the corpus of the trust herein created is insufficient to
meet the needs of my daughter, 1<-,aye F. Hamilton, then and
in that event, in the sole discretion of the trustees herein,
the trustees may pay to my said daughter, Faye F. Hamilton,
such amounts from the principal or corpus of the trust
sufficient to meet her nPeds, care and comforts. . . .
"(f) Anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding, this trm;t shall cease and terminate upon the following conditions:
"(1-a) Provided my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, be liv-
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ing, this trust shall terminate upon the death of Alex C.
Hamilton, or his divorce from my said daughter, Faye 1:<'.
Hamilton, in which event all the property held by the trustees
herein shall be distributed to my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, or
"(1-b) Upon the death of my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton,
this trust shall cease and terminate and all the property held
by the trustees under the terms hereof shall be distributed
one-half to my son, George D. Ferrall, and one-half to my
three grandchildren, George D. Ferrall, Jr., John Charters
l1"errall and Frank M. Ferrall, share and share alike."
At the time of the execution of the will and prior thereto
Mrs. Hamilton was afflicted with an incurable disease known
as multiple sclerosis. Her condition was known to the testator.
After his death her condition became worse and in January,
1942, she >vas placed in a sanitarium. Thereafter she was
bedridden most of the time and required medical and nursing
care. In 1948 she was declared to be an incompetent and her
husband, Alex C. Hamilton, was appointed guardian of her
person and estate.
On two previous occasions the trust here involved has been
before the courts. In the first action Mrs. Hamilton sought
to have the trust declared invalid by reason of the inclusion
therein of clause (1-a) above set forth on the ground that it
was an invitation for divorce proceedings between herself
and her husband, was against public policy and rendered
the entire trust provisions of the will void. Her efforts in
that proceeding, if successful, would have resulted in the
distribution to her of one-half of the estate freed from the
trust requirements. She was unsuccessful. (Hamilton v.
Ferrall (June 8, 1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 277 [206 P.2d 663] .)
In June, 1947, Mrs. Hamilton petitioned the court to direct
the trustees to make payments to her of $450 per month from
income and corpus for her "needs, care and comforts," and
to reimburse her from that source for sums theretofore paid
by her for that purpose from her personal funds. The trial
court in that proceeding found that it was the intention of
the trustor to provide for the maintenance of his daughter
from corpus; that $400 per month was a reasonable sum to be
paid for that purpose, and ordered the trustees to pay to her
from that source that sum per month, commencing June 10,
1947, and until further order of the court.
On appeal that judgment was reversed on the ground that
before the court could intervene to review and control the
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action of the trustees in their administration of the trust
there must be pleadings, proof and findings of fraud, bad
faith or abuse of discretion on their part; and that no such
pleading, proof or finding had been made. (Estate of Ferrall
(July 1, 1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 712 [207 P.2d 1077].)
While the appeal from the latter judgment was pending
the guardian caused a demand to be served upon the trustees.
The demand stated that the condition of the beneficiary had
greatly deteriorated; that she required $475 per month for
her care at the sanitarium; that prior to June, 1947, she had
disposed of most of her personal assets; that neither she
nor her husband was in a position to defray the costs and
expenses necessary to provide for her care, needs and comfort ;
demanded that the trustees ''exercise'' their ''discretion'' as
provided by the terms of the trust to invade the corpus for
that purpose; and that to that end they enter upon an immediate investigation of the facts and of the condition and requirements of the beneficiary.
This demand was served on the trustees on January 31,
1949. On February 11, 1949, the trust officer in charge of
the Ferrall trust at the Bank of America advised the guardian
by letter that the trustees were not in a position to take any
action on the demand until the questions involved on the
appeal then pending were finally decided by a court of last
resort. He requested that Mr. Hamilton furnish data as to
the guardianship assets and disbursements from its inception,
a statement as to his income, expense and financial status, and
a financial statement of Hamilton's Men's Shop, Inc. The
stock in that corporation was entirely owned by Mr. Hamilton
and was apparently community property. About a year later
Mr. Hamilton complied with this request. Thereafter the
trustees determined that the beneficiary's expenses were being
currently paid at the sanitarium; that she was not in need and
there was no duty upon them to invade the corpus; that the
primary obligation for her support and maintenance rested
on her husband, and that he was paying her bills.
In May, 1950, the trustees announced their refusal to
comply with the demand. The present proceeding was then
commenced in August, 1950, by the beneficiary, through her
guardian, under section 1120 of the Probate Code by the filing
of a supplemental petition to have it determined in accordance with the terms of the demand: (1) that the necessary expense for the care of the beneficiary is and has been since
January 31, 1949, the sum of $475 per month; (2) that the
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beneficiary, prior to January 31, 1949, had expended and
disposed of all of her personal assets, and that her only income
from the trust estate is approximately $50 per month; (3)
that by the terms of the will of the decedent the beneficiary
is entitled to receive $475 per month from the trust estate
and that resort to the corpus of the trust estate to that
extent should be had, and ( 4) that the trustees did exercise
their discretion and did refuse to invade the corpus for the
beneficiary's needs, but that in so acting the trustees abused
their discretion and acted in bad faith.
It was also prayed that the court instruct and direct the
trustees to pay to the guardian of the beneficiary the sum
of $475 per month "and to resort to and invade the corpus
of the trust to such extent as may be necessary or required
from January 31, 1949, until further order of the court."
The trustees filed a joint answer to the petition for instructions wherein they alleged among other things that, pursuant
to the demand made upon them on behalf of the beneficiary,
they had made a full and complete investigation of the
matters and things set forth in the demand and that following their investigation they did, on June 15, 1950, exercise
their discretion and refused to invade the corpus of the trust
estate, for the care and maintenance of the beneficiary. They
alleged that in so doing they did not act in bad faith or abuse
their discretion, and alleged that they acted in good faith
and with reasonable and prudent judgment.
.At the trial the following facts were stipulated to be true:
that the testator knew that his daughter was afflicted with a
progressive disease at the time he executed his will in 1938 and
at the time he died in 1940; that in January, 1942, the condition of the beneficiary was such that she had to be placed
in a sanitarium; that she had required medical and nursing
care ever since; that during most of the period since 1942 she
was completely incapable, physically and mentally, of handling
her own affairs; that the average expense for her needs, including sanitarium charges for room and board, nurses, medical care and supplies, for the period January 31, 1949, to May
15, 1950, was and is $400 a month; that during that period
Mrs. Hamilton had an income of $128.83 per month, including
$82.50 from the trust estate, $38 from certain insurance,
and $8.33 as dividends from certain stock, but that her
available income averaged only $79.23 per month because of
certain payments for attorneys' fees in connection with prior
litigation ; that her sole remaining personal assets included
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$70.70 in cash and 50 shares of Union Oil Company stock;
and that the value of the corpus of the trust estate was
$27,000. It was shown at the trial that this $27,000 consisted
of negotiable and liquid assets.
Because of the issue whether the trust instrument contemplated that the beneficiary should be in actual need before
the trustees were required to invade the corpus, evidence in
the present proceeding vvas introducd as to possible community
property earnings or community property interest of the
beneficiary and her husband. The court did not make a finding
that the husband had or had not ability to pay. It did find
that during 1949 he had received $12,315.70 from Hamilton's
Men's Shop, Inc., and that this sum had been returned as
salary in the federal and state tax returns of Mr. and Mrs.
Hamilton for that year.
The court construed the language of the trust instrument
to indicate the testator's intention that the only condition
imposed by him on the invasion of the corpus of the trust
was whether the income from the corpus was ''insufficient
to meet the needs of my daughter.'' The court found that
the trustees had decided that the income from the corpus
was insufficient for those purposes. It also found that there
was no express or implied requirement in the trust that the
trustees consider either the individual income of the beneficiary, her personal assets or her other resources in determining her needs; and that in refusing to invade the corpus for
the purpose of paying any portion of the cost or expense
of providing for the needs, care or comfort the trustees had
abused their discretion; that they did not act in a state of
mind in which it was contemplated they would act by the
testator; and that they had acted beyond the bounds of a
reasonable judgment.
Judgment was entered ordering the trustees to determine,
in the exercise of their discretion, the amounts necessary
and sufficient, commencing Jan nary 31, 1949, which was the
date of the demand, to meet, provide and pay for the necessary
needs, care and comfort of the beneficiary; to determine the
amount of net income distributed or distributable to her; and
without regard to or consideration of her separate property
or income or her interest in the community property or
other sources of income, to invade the corpus and pay therefrom amounts representing the difference between the net
income and the amounts they found necessary to provide for
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her proper care, needs and comfort. The trustees and the
remaindermen filed separate appeals.
The contentions of the appellants are, first, that the decision of the trial court is contrary to the law established in
the prior litigation, and secondly, that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that the trustees were guilty
of an abuse of discretion in refusing to invade the corpus
as required by the demand served upon them.
As to the first point the appellants rely especially on the
language of the court in Estate of Ferrall, supra, 92 Cal.App.
2d 712, where it is said at pages 715-716 : ''As above shown,
the decree creating the trust provided that 'if at any time
the income from the corpus . . . is insufficient to meet the
needs of my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, then and in that
event, in the sole discretion of the trustees herein, the trustees
may pay to my said daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, such amounts
from the principal or corpus of the trust sufficient to meet
her needs, care and comforts.' Under that provision a court
is not deprived of power to determine the fact as to whether
the income from the corpus is insufficient to meet the needs
of Mrs. Hamilton. By that provision, however, the matter
of determining the amounts to be paid from the corpus, in
the event that the income is insufficient to meet her needs,
is left to the sole discretion of the trustees. Section 2269 of
the Civil Code provides: 'A discretionary power conferred
upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary
discretion, but may be controlled by the proper court if not
reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly
conferred by the declaration of trust.' An absolute discretion,
as to the amounts to be paid from the corpus, was conferred
by the trust provisions herein. An absolute discretion, exercised in good faith by a trustee, cannot be controlled by
a court on considerations going to the soundness of the
discretion so exercised.''
It is therefore contended that it has been decided that
it is within the "sole discretion of the trustees" to determine
the amounts to be paid from corpus and that the determination of the trustees is binding on this appeal.
There is nothing in the former decision which would imply
that the ''sole discretion'' vested in and exercised by the
trustees in this case is beyond court review. [1] If it were
exercised fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of discretion, it is subject to such review. [2] Whether good
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faith has been exercised, or whether fraud, bad faith or an
abuse of discretion has been committed is always subject
to consideration by the court upon appropriate allegations
and proof. (Estate of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 184 [114 P.2d 586];
Estate of Heard, 107 Cal.App.2d 225 [236 P.2d 810, 27 A.L.R.
2d 133]; Estate of Smith, 23 Cal.App.2d 383 [73 P.2d 239] .)
[3] The Restatement of Trusts states the general rule that
''It is against public policy to permit the settlor to relieve
the trustee of all accountability to the courts." ( § 187, comment k.) The appellants contend, however, that in the present
case the evidence establishes that as a matter of law the
trustees exercised their discretion in good faith and that
they are not otherwise accountable for their actions.
The determination whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the finding of the trial court that the trustees have
been guilty of an abuse of discretion requires an inquiry into
the intentions of the settlor in providing for his daughter
as he did, and an examination of the conduct of the trustees
in the administration of the trust.
It was unquestionably the intention of the settlor that
one-half of his estate be set aside in trust for the benefit
of his daughter during her lifetime. He made an outright
gift to her of the income from the trust but the gift to her
of the corpus was conditional. Had he intended a gift of
corpus as well as income he could have done as he did with
reference to his son and grandchildren to whom bequests
were made without the imposition of a trust. It is beyond
question that the settlor intended to provide, and did provide,
that no portion of the trust estate should pass to the hands
of Alex C. Hamilton, the beneficiary's husband. This is
readily apparent from the terms of clause (1-a) of section II
of the will wherein the settlor provided that if his daughter
be living the trust should terminate upon the death of her
husband or his divorce from her, in either of which events
''all the property held by the trustees herein shall be distributed to my daughter." To make certain that Mr. Hamilton should share no interest in the trust estate, clause ( 1-b)
followed providing that "Upon the death of my daughter,
Faye F. Hamilton, this trust shall cease and terminate and
the property held by the trustees under the terms hereof
shall be distributed one-half to my son George D. Ferrall,
and one-half to my three grandchildren,'' sons of George,
share and share alike. [ 4] Under the terms of the trust
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it was clearly intended that Alex C. Hamilton should not
obtain an interest in the corpus and also that the only contingencies upon which Faye Hamilton would be entitled to a
gift of the entire corpus were those by which her marriage
to Alex C. Hamilton was terminated. By no process of
reasoning or construction of the trust instrument could it
properly be concluded that the settlor intended that during the
life of his daughter and the continuance of her marriage
Mr. Hamilton should be relieved of the responsibility for the
maintenance of his wife. This primary responsibility is provided for in section 155 of the Civil Code as follows: "Husband and wife contract towards each other obligations of
mutual respect, fidelity, and support." [5] It is the duty
of the husband to support his wife even though she has an
estate of her own. (Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal.App.
2d 768, 776 (234 P.2d 230]; Davis v. Davis, 65 Cal.App. 499,
501 [224 P. 478]; Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal.App. 288 [200 P.
364]; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 15, p. 404.)
The respondent does not question the authorities to the
effect that it is the duty of the husband to provide support
for his wife even though she may have an estate of her own,
or that the court in guardianship matters may refuse to allow
payment for the care of an incompetent wife from guardianship funds. But he takes the position that ability to pay
on the part of the husband must be shown and, apparently,
that the showing of ability to pay devolves upon the party
who insists upon the discharge of the husband's legal obligation. [6] But where, as here, affirmative relief is sought on
the ground that there has been a shift in the primary obligation of support, it is incumbent upon the one seeking relief to
plead and prove facts which would justify such a shift, as an
element of his cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §1981; see,
also, Guardianship of Thrasher, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 768.)
[7] The obvious intent of clauses (1-a) and (1-b) was to
preserve the corpus of the trust intact for distribution to
the remaindermen, all lineal descendants of the settlor, except
in the event that the income was insufficient to meet the
needs of Faye Hamilton. In construing this latter provision
the clear and steadfast intent to withhold benefit of the corpus
from Mr. Hamilton must be taken into consideration. Had
the settlor intended "needs" to be the total amount required to maintain and support his daughter, Mr. Hamilton
would have benefited to the extent of his relief from his
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primary, legal obligation to support her to the extent of his
ability, and there is no showing or finding that he was not
able to do so. Obviously, money for actual needs was intended
to be taken from the corpus. Since all requirements had been
and were being supplied from other sources, namely, by or
through lVIr. Hamilton, an invasion of corpus for reimbursement to him or the guardianship estate would be directly contrary to the intentions of the settlor and greatly to the prejudice of the remaindermen whose interests the trustees were
also bound to safeguard.
Courts in other states have construed provisions similar
to those in the present case. In ""tlatter of Mar-tin, 269 N.Y.
305 [199 N.E. 491], a will provided for the outright gift of
the income of a testamentary trust with a conditional gift of
the principal to the beneficiary ''as she may require for her
care, support and comfort, during her natural life.'' The
court concluded that the corpus could be invaded ''only in
the event that the income from the trust fund supplemented
by her independent income shall be insufficient to provide for
her proper care, support and comfort.'' In a similar factual
situation the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the
testator did not intend that the trustees should invade the
principal so long as the income and the available resources
of the life tenants were sufficient for their comfortable support. (Peckha.m v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321 [4 A. 758) .) [8] In
summarizing these and the holdings in other cases it was
stated in 2 American Law Reports, Second Series, 1432: "By
the weight of authority, unless the language of the trust instrument affirmatively reveals an intention to make a gift of
the stated benefaction regardless of the beneficiary's other
means, the trustee should consider such other means in exercising his discretion to disburse the principal. . . . ''
[9] \Vhen we pass to the consideration of the duty of the
trustees in the administration of the trust and their conduct
in compliance therewith, there is no divergence of authority
to the effect that the trust must be administered in accordance with the intentions of the settlor. [10] The rule is
well stated in section 187, comment j, Restatement of Trusts,
page 488, as follows: ''The extent of the discretion conferred
upon the trustees depends primarily upon the manifestation
of intention of the settlor. . . . [11] The mere fact that the
trustee is given discretion does not authorize him to act beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.'' [12] Even
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though it is provided that the trustees shall have absolute
or unlimited or uncontrolled discretion, the court may interpose if the trustee does not act ''in a state of mind in which
it was contemplated by the settlor that he would act.'' (Comment j, p. 489.)
As to the question whether the trustees here involved
acted ''in a state of mind in which it was contemplated by
the settlor" the evidence shows that the trustees concluded
that the settlor intended that the beneficiary's needs be her
actual needs and that they took into consideration Mr. Hamilton's primary obligation and ability to provide for them.
[13] The trustees are entitled to the presumption that they
acted in good faith. (Estate of Canfield, 80 Oal.App.2d 443,
451 [181 P.2d 732] .) [14] They contend that there is no
evidence to the contrary and that the record affirmatively
shows as a matter of law that their conduct was proper.
This conclusion must be sustained. On February 11, 1949,
11 days after the ''notice and demand'' that the corpus of
the trust be invaded was served upon them, they requested
information from Mr. Hamilton to establish the claim made by
him as guardian. While awaiting this information they made
an independent investigation and concluded that the obligations of the beneficiary were being met and that she was
receiving adequate medical care and treatment. It was
more than a year after their request for information that
Mr. Hamilton supplied financial data. There was no showing by him that any medical bills remained unpaid or that he
would be unable to provide his wife with medical care and
treatment in the future. For aught that appears in the
record Mr. Hamilton provided for his wife's maintenance
from the time of their marriage until she became ill. And
there is positive and undisputed proof that the costs and
expenses of his wife's care and maintenance after she became ill were paid. Despite the request of the trustees, Mr.
Hamilton failed to substantiate the allegations of the "notice
and demand.'' The trustees were justified in concluding that
the daughter was not in actual need and that the corpus of
the trust should not be disbursed in payment of her expenses.
Under these circumstances the conclusion is inescapable that
on the facts furnished to them or within their knowledge
from their own investigation the trustees were not guilty of
an abuse of discretion in their refusal to invade the corpus
for the purpose demanded. They made a reasonable investi-
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gation and did all that was required of them as fiduciaries to
carry out the terms of the trust.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The more persuasive authority holds that where words
such as those here used are involved, the amount required
to be paid to the beneficiary of the trust is computed without
consideration of his other sources of income and certainly
not the resources of the husband of the beneficiary here.
It is said: "It is a question of interpretation whether the
beneficiary is entitled to support out of the trust fund even
though he· has other resources. ·where the trustee is directed
to pay to the beneficiary or to apply for him so much as is
necessary for his maintenance or support, the inference is that
the settlor intended that he should receive his support from
the trust estate, even though he might have other resources."
(Scott on Trusts,§ 128.4; emphasis added.) There being such
an inference, the probate court could and did draw it and
hence there is sufficient evidence to support its order.
It is not to be supposed that a testator would intend that
a beneficiary generally, or intended here that her husband
should lead a useless, idle life thus producing no independent
income. That, however, is precisely the result if consideration must be given to independent resources. The natural
tendency will be for the beneficiary or her husband, to eschew
lucrative endeavor because every penny earned will be a
penny lost as beneficiary of the trust. At least it is a reasonable inference that the testator did not have such an intention. As the court said in the leading case of Holden v.
Strong, 116 N.Y. 471 [22 N.E. 960, 961] : "We do not understand that, in order to receive the benefit of the provisions
of the will, it is necessary for him [beneficiary] to remain idle,
and refrain from all personal exertion; neither does the fact
that he is frugal and saving, and has accumulated a fund
which he has deposited in the bank, deprive him of the right
to the support provided for him. The trial court properly
held that the trustee was to exercise a sound judgment and
discretion as to whether the money necessary for the support
and maintenance of the plaintiff should be delivered to him,
and he allowed to procure it, or whether the board, clothing,
etc., should be purchased and provided for him by the trustee.''
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[41 C.2d 166; 258 P.2d 1009]

That case was cited with approval and followed in In re
Clark's Will, 280 N.Y. 155 [19 N.E.2d 1001], where it was
said (p. 1003) : "The will clearly provides for payment by
the trustee . . . of the entire income from the trust and of
so much of the principal in addition thereto as, in the sole
judgment of the trustee, shall by it be deemed necessary for
every comfort and support of the widow. . . . In conformity
to that purpose and intent, the trustee is required to furnish
every comfort and support for the widow which it may deem
in a sound discretion necessary out of income and, if required,
out of the corpus, even to the extent of exhausting the entire
corpus of the trust, without taking into consideration or account the personal income of the beneficiary from any other
sottrce. Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471 [22 N.E. 960] ; Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184 [140 N.E. 237]." (Emphasis
added.) The Clark case was decided (1939) six years after
In re Martin's Will (1933), 269 N.Y. 305 [199 N.E. 491],
relied upon by the majority, and the Clark case does not even
mention the Martin case.
To the same effect as the Clark case and the quotation from
Scott on Trusts, see Cross v. Pharr, 215 Ark. 463 [221 S.W.2d
24] ; Hoops v. Stephan, 131 Conn. 138 [38 A.2d 588] ; In re
Worman's Estate, 231 Iowa 1351 [4 N.W.2d 373]; Pearce v.
Marcelltts, 137 N.J.Eq. 599 [45 A.2d 889]; In re Leonard's
Estate, 115 Vt. 440 [63 A.2d 179]; and cases collected, Scott
on Trusts, § 128.4; 2 A.L.R.2d 1383, 1431.
Finally, the same rule is stated: "It is a question of interpretation whether the beneficiary is entitled to support out of
the trust fund even though he has other resources. The inference is that he is so entitled." (Rest. Trusts, § 128e; emphasis
added.)
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the views expressed by Justice
Carter. It further appears to me that the death of the beneficiary, Mrs. Hamilton, provides no ground for avoidance of
payment to her estate of the sums which she was entitled to
receive while she was living. (See Board of Soc. Welfare v.
County of Los Angeles (1945), 27 Cal.2d 81, 86, 88-89 [162
P.2d 630] .) I, too, would affirm the judgment.

